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I. INTRODUCTION 
Despite the enaction of federal civil rights reforms in the 1960s, 
the socioeconomic status of people of color, African-Americans l in 
particular, improved only to a small degree over the last two de-
cades.2 Evidence indicates that the African-American community is 
economically bifurcated into a large, impoverished urban under-
1 "African-American" and "Black" are used interchangeably in this Note to denote a 
specific cultural group. See Wilkerson, "African-American" Favored fry Many of America's Blacks, 
N.Y.Times, Jan. 31, 1989, at 1, col. 1. See also MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and 
the State: An Agendafor Theory, 7 SIGNS: J. WOMEN IN CULTURE & Soc'y 515, 516 (1982)(noting 
that "Black" should not be perceived "as merely a color of skin pigmentation. but as a 
heritage. an experience, a cultural and personal identity, the meaning of which becomes 
specifically sigmatic and/or glorious and/or ordinary under specific social conditions"). For a 
discussion of the political overtones of the naming of Americans of African descent see W.E.B. 
DuBOIS. 2 THE SEVENTH SON 12-13 (1971). "Minorities" and "people of color" are also used 
interchangeably. 
2 See NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE. THE STATE OF BLACK AMERICA 1990 (1990). The gap 
between the socioeconomic status of African-Americans and whites remains wide and grows 
wider in a variety of categories. For example, in 1988, the poverty rate for African-Americans 
stood at 31.6%, while that for whites was 10%. Id. at 25. 28. 34. The median family income 
for African-Americans in the 1980s fell below their median income in the 1970s and is only 
57% that of white median family income. See also Bernstein, 20 Years After the Kerner Report: 
Three Societies, All Separate. N.Y. Times, Feb. 29, 1988. at B8. col. 2; G. JAYNES AND R. 
WILLIAMS, A COMMON DESTINY: BLACKS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 6-31, 269-329 (1989). Some 
commentators suggest that developments in the status of African-Americans mirror devel-
opments in the population at large. In particular. real earnings of Americans improved 
steadily for the period 1940-1973. but they stagnated and declined after 1973. Id. 
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class and a disproportionately small middle class. 3 Congress enacted 
the civil rights reforms in the 1960s to provide political and eco-
nomic empowerment to those citizens, principally African-Ameri-
cans, who historically had been disadvantaged by discrimination and 
victimized by racism.4 After their enactment, these originally vague 
statutes underwent twenty-five years of judicial refinement defining 
their scope and content to effectuate their designated purposes.s 
Recent Supreme Court cases concerning the body of civil rights 
law produced by that judicial refinement, however, indicate a retreat 
from the constructive activity of the preceding two decades. Re-
sponding to the litigious attacks of the Reagan Administration J us-
tice Department, the Supreme Court systematically altered this body 
of civil rights law. 6 Precedents that for many years provided plain-
tiffs who suffered discriminatory harm with relatively effective legal 
recourse were altered to the benefit of future defendants in civil 
rights actions. 7 As demonstrated during the 1989 Summer Term, 
the Court is clearly no longer an ally of the civil rights community.8 
3 See W. WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND 
PUBLIC POLICY (1987); see also Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and 
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1332 n.3 (1988). 
4 The Civil Rights Reforms of the 1960s, popularly known as the Second Reconstruction 
(the "first" legislative Reconstruction followed the Civil War), are codified as the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-2000h(6)(1982) and the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission regulations, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1600-1691(1990). These enactments provide protec-
tion against employment discrimination, secure voting rights, and establish a system for 
deciding controversies. 
5 See Brodin, Reflections on the Supreme Court's 1988 Term: The Employment Discrimination 
Decisions and the Abandonment of the Second Reconstruction, 31 B.C.L. REV. 1, 2 (1990). The 
vagueness of the statutes reflected the product of political compromises made by the drafting 
legislators. Most of the federal judiciary's activity focused on Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act which prohibits employment discrimination. While deciding cases brought under Title 
VII, the courts created a system of case law governing standing, allocation of burdens of 
proof, and availability of different forms of relief. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 
U.S. 424 (1971). 
6 See ACLU, IN CONTEMPT OF CONGRESS AND THE COURTS-THE REAGAN CIVIL RIGHTS 
RECORD (1984); see generally Selig, The Reagan justice Department and Civil Rights: What Went 
Wrong, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 785; see generally D. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED (1987); Bell, 
The Supreme Court, 1984 Term-Foreword: The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1985). 
7 See Brodin, supra note 5, at 5-11, 25-30, 29 (arguing that the Court's 1988 Term 
decisions eliminated Title VII's "cutting edge," made prevailing in Title VII lawsuits more 
difficult for plaintiffs, and made defending such allegations of discrimination easier.) 
8 See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989) (increasing the 
evidentiary requirement needed to justify minority set aside programs); Wards Cove Packing, 
Inc. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989) (tightening the standard of proof required to establish 
employment discrimination, requiring specific causal mechanisms under a "but for" standard, 
rather than a combination of mechanisms under a substantial cause standard); Martin v. 
Wilks, 109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989) (reopening consent decrees to challenges of reverse discrimi-
nation by persons not originally parties to the decree). 
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Jurisprudential scholars are critical of the Court's hostile treatment 
of employment discrimination and affirmative action case law.9 Mi-
nority scholars in particular question the Court's commitment to 
remedying persistent social and economic problems that plague 
people of color and people of limited means in our society.Io From 
a broad perspective, the Court's recent decisions underscore the 
special role played by the nation's judiciary in a liberal democracy-
fulfillment of which requires careful construction and interpretation 
of the law to achieve social justice. Contrasting the Court's recent 
decisions, which diminish plaintiffs' prospects for prevailing, with 
its constructive activity of the preceding two decades illustrates that 
judkial decisions may operate as a double-edged sword. For people 
of color and people of limited means, the decisions may affirma-
tively effect socioeconomic change or they may facilitate preserva-
tion of the status quo. 
The damaging assault on civil rights orchestrated by the Reagan 
Administration, along with the restrictive decisions issued by the 
Supreme Court, support the views of the jurisprudential 
movementll called Critical Legal Studies (CLS).12 A fundamental 
tenet of CLS holds that law is composed of indeterminate legal rules 
used by the politically powerful to further their own ideological 
objectives. 13 Critical Legal Scholars argue that these indeterminate 
legal rules are susceptible to skillful and deceptive manipulation by 
those groups in our society that control the political machinery. 
Frequently, these rules seem to generate contradictory results. 14 
9 See Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Committee Report, VoI.3;No. 3, at 
1 (Summer 1989) [hereinafter Committee Report]. Laurence Tribe, of Harvard Law School, 
remarked, "I am extremely critical of the Court's overall handling of the civil rights cases 
this Term .... 1 think there is a clear, convincing, and compelling need for a Civil Rights 
Restoration Act of 1989 to undo some of the Court's demolition work of this Term." Id. 
10 See, e.g., id. at 1,2, 12, 13. 
11 Jurisprudence, or the philosophy of law, is "that science which has as its function to 
ascertain the principles on which legal rules are based, so as not only to classify those rules 
in their proper order, and show the relation in which they stand to one another, but also to 
settle the manner in which new or doubtful cases should be brought under the appropriate 
rules." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 767 (5th ed. 1987). 
12 Committee Report, supra note 9, at 12. Professor Derrick Bell of Harvard Law School, 
a minority proponent of CLS, recently remarked concerning the Court's rulings, "The 
decisions are a distressing but a wonderful affirmation of the CLS ... credo; namely that 
judicial decisions reflect less any kind of concern about precedent and constitutional inter-
pretation than they do the power, interest, and pressures of the society." Id. 
IS See generally Tushnet, Perspectives on Critical Legal Studies-Introduction, 52 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 239 (1984). 
14 See Fischl, Some Realism About Critical Legal Studies, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 505, 513-15 
(1987). 
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Given these assertions, the Movement's views merit close consider-
ation for their plausible analysis of the deliberate disarmament of 
civil rights law by the Reagan and Bush Administrations and the 
Supreme Court. 
Minority Legal Scholars (Minority Scholars) and Critical Legal 
Scholars may share skeptical views of politics, law, and society, but, 
despite their shared perspectives, minorities have not embraced the 
CLS Movement. 15 'The traditional alliance between people of color 
and left-originating reform movements that marked the 1960s civil 
rights era has failed to develop. Moreover, no indication exists of 
substantial contributions by minorities to the Movement's confer-
ences and scholarship prior to the CLS conference of 1987-there 
was neither an alliance nor even a significant collaborative relation-
ship.16 In an attempt to examine this schism, which on its face 
appeared counterintuitive, the 1987 annual CLS conference fo-
cused on the issue of race. 17 The conference was aptly titled "The 
Sounds of Silence: Racism and the Law,"18 illustrating the kinds of 
issues that Minority Scholars found absent from the CLS agenda. 
More specifically, CLS failed to integrate the problem of racism into 
its theory and failed to offer viable prescriptions for combatting the 
discriminatory effects of racism in its agenda. 19 
This Note examines substantively the Minority Scholar-CLS 
dialogue generated by the CLS conference of 1987. As a foundation 
for presenting and analyzing the dialogue, Part II surveys the com-
position, history and theory of CLS. Part III analyzes Minority 
Scholar critiques of CLS and CLS responses, with attention to those 
elements of CLS that Minority Scholars find problematic. Part IV 
argues that although CLS presents insightful and critical jurispru-
dence, in its current form CLS offers limited utility to minorities in 
developing a social reform agenda. Fundamental contradictions be-
15 See Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities Want?, 
22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 301, 301 n.1 (1987). 
16 See Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV, CR.-
C.L. L. REV. 323, 323 (1987). 
17 See Introduction, 23 HARV. CR.-CL. L. REV. 293, 293 (1988). Volume 23 was devoted 
in its entirety to Minority Scholar critiques of CLS. 
A similar attempt to expand the CLS dialogue was undertaken at the 1985 CLS confer-
ence which was devoted to the issue of feminism and the solicitation of feminist scholarship, 
See Matsuda, supra note 16, at 343 n,88 and accompanying text. 
18 See Introduction, supra note 17, at 293. 
19 Subsequent to this conference, these Minority Scholars created an informal group for 
the purposes of encouraging research and scholarship in the area of race law and critical 
theory, filling the void left untouched by CLS. See excerpts of the report from the first annual 
Workshop on New Developments in Critical Race Theory published in the 1989 Newsletter 
of the Conference on Critical Legal Studies. 
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tween that which CLS advocates and that which minoritIes seek 
preclude minorities from embracing the CLS Movement completely. 
II. OVERVIEW OF CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (CLS) 
Throughout most of its existence, the CLS Movement has gen-
erated heated debate within the legal community. The initial recep-
tion of CLS varied greatly. The most favorable response viewed 
CLS as welcome intellectual provocation;20 the least favorable as 
unwelcome "nihilism."21 The CLS Movement originated among a 
group of faculty and young student activists who attended Yale Law 
School together in the late 1960s.22 The same radical intellectual 
energy that fueled much of the social activism against the Vietnam 
War and for civil rights reform at universities in the 1960s also 
spawned the development of CLS in the late 1970s.23 The activist 
roots of its founding members account for the CLS Movement's 
wide-ranging radical leftist jurisprudence. As academic paths ma-
tured into professional careers, the young activists turned their anti-
establishment energies toward the legal system, in which they had 
become major participants. CLS now consists primarily of law pro-
fessors and students, in addition to a few practicing lawyers and 
social scientists.24 The number of CLS scholars totals at least 150 
and the body of CLS scholarship is topically vast. 25 
The CLS Movement is led primarily by a small group of law 
professors responsible for organizing its activities.26 Duncan Ken-
20 See Haines, The Critical Legal Studies Movement and Racism: Useful Analytics and Guides 
for Social Action or an Irrelevant Modern Legal Skepticism and Solipsism? 13 WM. MITCHELL L. 
REV. 685, 692 (1987). 
21 Dean Paul Carrington of Duke Law School labeled CLS adherents "nihilists ... [who] 
have an ethical duty to depart the law school, perhaps to seek a place elsewhere in the 
academy." Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL Eouc. 222, 227 (1984); see also 
Schlegel, Notes Toward an Intimate, Opinionated, and Affectionate History of the Conference on 
Critical Legal Studies, 36 STAN. L. REV. 391, 403 (1984) (quoting Mark Tushnet's anticipation 
of the ultra-leftist movement's reception, "when they find out what we are doing they will 
come after us with guns"); see generally Johnson, Do You Sincerely Want to Be Radical?, 36 STAN. 
L. REV. 247 (1984). 
22 See generally Barrister Interview with Duncan Kennedy, 14 BARRISTER 12 (Fall 1987). 
23 See CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 2 (A. Hutchinson ed. 1987) [hereinafter CRITICAL LEGAL 
STUDIES]. 
24 The Yale Law Journal, with the aid of Duncan Kennedy and Karl Klare, compiled a 
bibliography of CLS works that illustrates the expansive nature of the CLS Movement. It 
contains a great many authors, hundreds of works, and spans various disciplines, including 
sociology and economics. See generally Bibliography, 94 YALE L.J. 461 (1984) [hereinafter 
Bibliography]. 
25 See CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES, supra note 23, at 1. 
26 See Bibliography, supra note 24, at 461 n.1. The CLS Movement's activities include 
holding national conventions and "summer camps" to discuss legal theory and to encourage 
critical research and writing among the network of adherents and interested parties. Id. 
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nedy, Karl Klare, Alan Freeman, Roberto Unger, Robert Gordon, 
Morton Horowitz, and Mark Tushnet27 stand out as representative 
members. It is important to note that the majority of CLS propo-
nents are white, Ivy League-educated, and male. There exists a 
small number of feminists, such as Clare Dalton,28 and minorities, 
such as Derrick Bell,29 who also have contributed to CLS scholar-
ship, but their numbers are disproportionately small compared to 
the number of white, male contributors. The CLS Movement's vir-
tually homogenous composition gives rise to one of the primary 
criticisms leveled at CLS by Minority Scholars: that the lack of 
diversity in the Movement's contributing membership accounts in 
large part for the Movement's neglect of issues of race in its agenda. 
Minorities observe that the CLS Movement's composition bears the 
same characteristics as most other institutions in legal academia.30 
Critical dialogues are maintained within the CLS Movement 
with the use of legal scholarship, primarily in the more prestigious 
law reviews.31 CLS purports to condemn the law reviews as institu-
tions of hierarchy and conservativism that serve only to propagate 
the status quo within the stratified legal academies. But use of the 
law reviews is necessary to CLS for several reasons. First, presenting 
critical dialogues in the law reviews ensures that CLS engages rival 
jurisprudential theories as coequals from academically respected 
standing, lending legitimacy and drawing attention to their views, 
often considered too radical to enter the mainstream collection of 
jurisprudential analyses. Also, law reviews possess special signifi-
cance in the development of jurisprudence because they are tradi-
tionally sources of new developments in legal theory and "creative 
suggestions" for "law reform activities."32 From this respected po-
sition, the CLS aim is to expose the allegedly flawed logic of these 
mainstream jurisprudential analyses. 
27 Professor of Law, Harvard Law School; Professor of Law, Northeastern University; 
Professor of Law, Buffalo Law School; Professor of Law, Harvard Law School; Professor of 
Law, Stanford Law School; Professor of American Legal History, Harvard Law School; 
Professor of Law, Georgetown Law School, respectively. 
28 Visiting Professor of Law, Northeastern Law School. 
29 Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. 
30 See, e.g., Matsuda, supra note 16, at 342. 
31 For example, volume 36 of The Stanford Law Review (1984) was devoted in its 
entirety to the subject of CLS, as were large portions of volumes 22 (1987) and 23 (1988) of 
The Harvard Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Law Review, supra note 14. See Schlegel, supra 
note 21, at 406, n. 45 (discussing the academic and professional credentials of CLS propo-
nents). 
32 See Closen, A Proposed Code of Professional Responsibility for Law Reviews, 63 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 55, 55 (1988). 
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Practical and substantive complications burden an attempted 
CLS overview. The number of CLS adherents is so large as to make 
comprehensive coverage impracticable.33 Also, with substantive dif-
ferences in theory existing within the CLS Movement, pinpointing 
the primary tenets carries the risk of excluding important views and 
failing to present the unbounded essence of the Movement.34 Thus, 
an overview of CLS is less a catalogue of theories than it is a 
presentation of themes common to all of its various works. 
A. Social and Jurisprudential Antecedents of Critical Legal Studies 
CLS in part derives from two leftist movements prominent 
during the early and middle portions of this century, Critical Social 
Theory and American Legal Realism (ALR).35 Critical Social The-
ory, for which the principal inspirations were the writings of Karl 
Marx and Friedrich Nietzche, maintains that the normative source 
for law resides in social, economic and material conditions.36 Pre-
vailing law changes according to variations in the social, economic, 
and material needs of the ruling class. The popular name for this 
theory was Marxist instrumentalism.37 For the predominantly Eu-
ropean followers of Critical Social Theory, hierarchy remained crys-
tallized conceptually in society, while the laws remained in flux as 
an ideological instrument. 38 
ALR, which "flourished" in the United States at several eastern 
law schools in the 1920s and 1930s,39 denounced any value to con-
structing a theory of judicial decision-making.40 ALR viewed the 
economic exigencies pervading life in the 1920s and 1930s, and the 
social legislation enacted to mitigate those exigencies, as the factors 
most influencing judicial decision-making. The Realists argued that 
in this context, the notion of an objective, impartial system of legal 
33 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
34 See Fischl, supra note 14, at 507; Haines, supra note 20, at 701. For a description of 
the factions within the CLS Movement, see Hutchinson & Monahan, Law, Politics, and the 
Critical Legal Scholars: The Unfolding DraUta of American Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REV. 199, 
219-27 (1984). 
35 See Williams, Taking Rights Aggressively: The Perils and Promise of Critical Legal Theory 
for Peoples of Color, 5 J. L. & INEQUALITY 103, 115-19 (1987). 
36 [d. 
37 See generally H. COLLINS, MARXISM AND LAW (1982). 
38 For a discussion of the impact of Critical Social Theory on CLS, see Hutchinson and 
Monahan, supra note 34, at 213-30. 
39 [d. 
40 For a comparison of CLS and ALR, see generally Note, 'Round and 'Round the Bramble 
Bush: From Legal Realism to Critical Legal Scholarship, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1670-86 (1982) 
[hereinafter Note]. 
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thought is illusory because legal reasoning is indeterminate.41 Prec-
edents can be manipulated to support any desired outcome, and 
economic exigencies, not legal rules, determine which outcome ap-
peared more logically desirable. 42 In response to this perceived 
indeterminacy, the Realists believed that decision-making should be 
based upon empirical data gathered in scientific research, rather 
than upon artificial legal concepts.43 The institutional constructs 
envisioned by the Realists to perform this function were the expert 
administrative agencies that later proliferated during the New Deal 
era.44 
The substantive difference between ALR and CLS, however, is 
that ALR was unequivocal in its commitment to liberalism.45 This 
commitment to working within the existing legal and political insti-
tutional machinery distinguishes the two movements, for CLS har-
bors no similar commitment. 46 Because of its ultra-leftist convictions, 
CLS denies that there is any value to preserving the current insti-
tutional machinery. This machinery. CLS argues, is premised upon 
the contradictory norms underpinning capitalistic and democratic 
society. This substantive difference between ALR and CLS results 
in the contrasting reformist policy programs of ALR and the radical 
agenda of CLSY 
B. Critical Legal Studies 
1. CLS Theory 
CLS consists primarily of two themes. The first theme is an 
assault on legal objectivism48 and formalism. 49 CLS premises this 
attack on the theory introduced by American Legal Realism that 
41 Id. at 1670. 
42 Id. at 1670-86. 
43 See Hutchinson & Monahan, supra note 34, at 204 n. 20. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 204. 
46 Id. at 199-202. 
47 See Note, supra note 40, at 1677. 
48 See CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES, supra note 23, at 323. "Objectivism is the belief that the 
authoritative legal materials-the system of statutes, cases, and accepted legal ideas-embody 
and sustain a defensible scheme of human association." Id. at 324. Objectivist norms are 
rooted in a discernable order which emanates from capitalistic and democratic principles. Id. 
at 323. 
49 Id. at 323. Formalism is a "commitment [to using] impersonal purposes, policies, and 
principles ... [as] indispensible components of legal reasoning." Id. Formalism presupposes 
an inherently apolitical, rational, and moral coherence to the workings of law. See generally 
Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Imminent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949, 951 (1988). In 
short, formalism asserts that there is a distinction between law and politics. I d. 
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legal rules are indeterminate. 50 CLS rejects the notion that law is 
"preexisting, clear, predictable, and discernable through legal rea-
soning .... "51 CLS scholars argue that the law is neither neutral 
nor value-free, but at every level involves policy choices. 52 Legal 
rules merely provide the appearance of certainty. 53 Although sup-
posedly based upon presumably neutral legal rules, any given ju-
dicial decision can be argued persuasively to the contrary. 54 
The institutions which bear responsibility for overseeing the 
proper functioning of our liberal democracy also bear responsibility 
for perpetuating the indeterminacy which plagues the system. This 
indeterminacy is in part a byproduct of the function played by the 
judiciary when deciding cases and developing law. CLS considers 
fallacious the assumption that judges have the unerring capacity to 
insulate themselves from individual and group politics, other exter-
nal pressures, and personal biases. 55 Therefore, statutory interpre-
tation and adjudicatory decision-making reflect the impact of these 
influences more than they reflect strict adherence to neutral rules. 
The exercise of textual interpretation, in particular, is ambiguous 
because "[a] textual interpretation based on a fragmentary passage 
can always be refuted by invoking the [broader purpose of] the 
document in its entirety, or its implicit structure .... "56 Also, when 
textual interpretation is not dispositive, a search for the drafter's 
intent carries an equal risk of ambiguity. Legislative compromises 
between politically opposite parties typically yield vague legisla-
tionY A judge giving overriding significance to one legislator's 
intent neglects the intentions of the other compromising legisla-
tors. 58 CLS thus argues that indeterminacy pervades those compo-
nents of the legal system popularly perceived as the most rational 
and neutral-legal rules and the decisions of the judiciary.59 
50 See supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text. 
51 See Harrison and Mashburn,jean-Luc Goddard and the Critical Legal Studies (Because We 
Need the Eggs), 87 MICH. L. REV. 1924, 1934 (1989). 
52 Id. 
53 Robert Gordon writes, "[I legal discourses are saturated with categories and images 
that for the most part rationalize and justify in myriad subtle ways the existing social order 
as natural, necessary and just." 3 TIKKUN 14, 15 (1988). 
5. See Fischl, supra note 14, at 509. 
55 See generally Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and 
Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983). 
56 See Freeman, Racism, Rights and the Quest for Equality of Opportunity: A Critical Legal 
Essay, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 295, 318 (1988). 
57 See, e.g., Brodin, supra note 5, at 1-2. 
58 See Delgado, supra note 15, at 302. See, e.g., Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. 
L. REV. 1057 (1980); D. KAIRYS, THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 1, 3 (D. 
Kairys ed. 1982). 
59 See D. Kairys, Law and Politics, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 243, 243-49 (1984). 
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Analysis of the fundamental principles of contract law illus-
trates the indeterminacy perceived by CLS. Traditional theories of 
liberalism ground the normative touchstones for objectivism in the 
capitalistic market and the democratic republic.6o If objectivism and 
formalism apply to contract law, then the normative sources under-
pinning the legal rules that order contract law should efficiently 
and justly operate the capitalistic market and the democratic re-
public. Optimally, the legal rules would be rational and the decision-
making bodies would be neutral. But each rule confronts a counter-
rule. For example, the primary rule-that private individuals are 
free to choose their own terms and parties, with the state's enforce-
ment capacity levied against a defaulting party-is met with an 
opposing rule-the state will intervene in defense of the collective 
interest in preventing enforcement of "grossly unfair bargains."61 
Indeterminacy thus arises as a result of the requirement that judges 
select one of these confEcting rules over another in order to justify 
a decision. Inherently different values are involved in this choice. 
Under the CLS perception, the normative sources actually give rise 
to conflict. 
The attack on objectivism and formalism generates the second 
major CLS theme, the attack on liberal rights theory.62 Liberal rights 
theory is the prevailing mainstream political idea that individuals 
possess fundamental rights that are protected and vindicated by the 
legal system.63 If, for CLS, the idea of objectivist and formalistic 
rules is a fallacy, then liberal rights theory must also be fallacious. 
CLS scholars argue that this notion is erroneously premised upon 
objective and formalistic legal reasoning revealed in the first theme. 
For CLS, liberal rights theory represents neither a defensible nor 
an adequate means of ordering society.64 
60 See CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES, supra note 23, at 325. 
61 Id. at 325-26. See generally Dalton, An Essay on the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 
94 YALE L.J. 16 (1985). 
62 Id. at 5. See also Tushnet, supra note 13, at 240. 
63 See CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES, supra note 23, at 15-35; Sparer, Fundamental Human 
Rights, Legal Entitlements, and the Social Struggle: A Friendly Critique of the CLS Movement, 36 
STAN. L. REV. 509, 516-22 (1984). 
64 See CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES, supra note 23, at 5. Robert Gordon writes: 
[C]onsider all the habitual daily invocations of law in official and unofficial life-
from the rhetoric of judicial opinions through advice lawyers give clients, down to 
all the assertions and arguments about legal rights and wrongs in ordinary inter-
actions between police and suspects, employers and workers, creditors and debtors, 
husbands, wives, and neighbors, or television characters portraying such people. 
Sometimes these ways of speaking about law appear as fancy technical arguments, 
sometimes as simple common sense. ("An employer has the right to control what 
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CLS argues that liberal rights theory in its current form is 
normatively bankrupt. 55 The scholars metaphorically describe lib-
eral rights rhetoric as being akin to a "patchwork quilt" underneath 
which there is a great deal of chaos.55 Liberal rights rhetoric conceals 
the presence of societal choices.57 This rhetoric masks the unre-
solved and contradictory values that motivate human action.58 Ex" 
am pies of these contradictory values are "reason and desire; free-
dom and necessity; individualism and altruism; autonomy and 
community; and subjectivity and objectivity."59 CLS argues that 
"things could be otherwise, and that choice is always essential."70 
Taking into account the consequences of choosing one value over 
another gives rise to collective responsibilities. Collective attention 
to responsibilities provides the appropriate normative order and 
structure to govern our relations and eliminates the need for pro-
tection in the form of rights from injurious acts of others. 
Additionally, CLS argues that liberal rights theory exerts a 
paralyzing, hegemonic force upon society.71 The popular perception 
that liberal rights theory is rooted in objectivist reasoning creates a 
false consciousness of necessity for objectivism and formalism. 72 
Liberal rights theory is simply a political fiction reifying the illusion 
that courts do not have to make value choices with societal impli-
cations. The grounding of liberal rights discourse in the received 
doctrine of objectivism circumscribes reformist dialogue, requiring 
any change to the system to come from within the system. For CLS, 
an appeal for vindication of one's rights represents participation in 
happens on his own property, doesn't he?") In whatever form, they are among the 
discourses that help us to make sense of the world, that fabricate what we interpret 
as its reality. They construct roles for us like "Owner" and "Employee," and tell us 
how to behave in the roles. (The person cast as "Employee" is subordinate. Why? It 
just is that way, part of the role.) They wall us off from one another by constituting 
us as separate individuals given rights to protect our isolation, but then prescribe 
formal channels (such as contracts, partnerships, corporations) through which we 
can reconnect. They split up the world into categories that filter our experience-
sorting out the harms we must accept as the hand of fate, or as our own fault, from 
the outrageous injustices we may resist as wrongfully forced upon us. 
TIKKUN, supra note 53, at 15. 
65 [d. at 4-5. See also Hutchinson and Monahan, supra note 34, at 208. 
66 See CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES, supra note 23, at 3. 
67 Hutchinson and Monahan, supra note 34, at 208-10. 
68 See id. 
69 See Sparer, supra note 63, at 516. 
70 See Boyle, The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought, 133 U. 
PENN. L. REV. 685, 689-90 (1985). 
71 See, e.g., Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1335. 
72 See Delgado, supra note 15, at 309-10. 
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a dialogue with hollow rhetoric. "[The rhetoric] ... reflects, legitim-
izes, and reinforces the pattern of existing social and legal arrange-
ments."73 Society becomes locked into the status quo because the 
rhetoric precludes development of innovative approaches to solving 
social problems. Rights discourse is thus an ideological mechanism 
for achieving and maintaining domination. 74 
Moreover, duplicative use of the rules and blind resort to the 
current legal system adds to the appearance of legitimacy and ob-
jectivity. Liberal rights rhetoric enables courts to manipulate and 
decide among the options presented by the current liberal rights 
discourse without effecting actual change in the present societal 
conditions. 75 The notion that liberal rights discourse can transform 
or remedy the "oppressive character of our social relations" and 
institutions is undermined by the presence of unresolved contra-
dictions and motivational values. 76 
CLS describes the limited trans formative potential of the cur-
rent liberal rights dialogue as the "contingent nature of the legal, 
political, and social order."77 "[W]ith power, money, and class as 
rank determinants ... illegitimate hierarchies are frozen into par-
alyzing structures: law/judge; judge/lawyer; law teacher/law student; 
private property/police power; management/labor; etc."78 In the 
context of adjudication, pitting two relatively unequal entities 
against each other, and assuming that indeterminate rules will dic-
tate a just outcome, is irrational. The system renders marginalized 
citizens debilitatingly dependent upon the will of the judiciary. CLS 
argues that there are inherent functional limits to attaining distri-
butive and corrective justice through the current system. In re-
sponse, the Movement searches for a true normative theory that 
can mediate the interplay of conflicting values without perpetuating 
the status quO. 79 
2. CLS Agenda 
Casting aside liberal rights theory because of its limited trans-
formative potential, CLS pursues its own ultra-radical agenda using 
73 See Harrison and Mashburn. supra note 51, at 1935. 
74 See Delgado, supra note 15, at 310. 
75 See Sparer, supra note 63, at 517. 
76 Id. 
77 Williams, supra note 35, at 119. 
78 See Harrison and Mashburn, supra note 51, at 1935. 
79 See Matsuda, supra note 16, at 324. 
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deconstruction, which is the methodological alternative to formal-
ism.80 Sometimes called delegitimization or "trashing," deconstruc-
tion is the mechanism CLS scholars use to expose the conflicting 
choices underlying accepted legal norms.8l Much of CLS's decon-
struction is premised on the belief that confrontation generates 
resolution and synthesis.82 "The [CLS] objective in deconstructing 
... an area of law is to make its conceptual structures visible and 
bare to scrutiny."83 A frequently quoted definition of trashing sug-
gests, "[t]ake specific arguments very seriously in their own terms; 
discover they are actually foolish ... ; and then look for some .. 
order ... in the internally contradictory, incoherent chaos ... 
exposed."84 
Trashing represents the primary focus and driving energy of 
the CLS agenda.85 The agenda's goal is to "complete the modern 
rebellion against the view that social arrangements are natural or 
inevitable."86 CLS scholars "seek in practice to identify and overturn 
all contingent, hierarchizing forms of legal consciousness in order 
to free up 'the infinite possibilities of human connection. "'87 Spurred 
by their attacks on formalism and liberal rights theory, Critical Legal 
Scholars utilize trashing to undertake a wide-ranging assault on all 
the social, political, and legal institutions and their supporting doc-
80 The term "deconstruction" has its origins in critical literary theory, particularly in the 
writings of Jacques Derrida. See generally J. DERRIDA, MARGINS OF PHILOSOPHY (A. Bass trans. 
1982). 
One Critical Legal Scholar, Alan Freeman, writes: "The point of [deconstruction] is to 
expose possibilities more truly expressing reality, possibilities of fashioning a future that 
might at least partially realize a substantive notion of justice instead of the abstract, rightsy, 
traditional, bourgeois notion of justice .... " Freeman, Truth and Mystification in Legal 
Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1229, 1230 (1981). 
81 See Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293 (1984). 
82 This idea of confrontation is derived from the Marxist dialectical approach of thesis/ 
antithesis/synthesis. See generally Brosnan, Serious But Not Critical, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 259, 
270-80 (1987). 
83 See Harrison and Mashburn, supra note 51, at 1937 (citing Boyle, supra note 69, at 
936). 
84 Kelman, supra note 81, at 293. With regard to trashing, Professor Boyle observed, "If 
the language seems bizarre, it is purposeful strangeness. Language itself, according to the 
Crits, is a conceptual structure of false necessities. Crits have attempted to invent a new 
language to expand our vocabulary and to facilitate their critique." Harrison and Mashburn, 
supra note 51, at 1937 (citing Boyle, supra note 69, at 936); see also Husson, Expanding the 
Legal Vocabulary: The Challenge Posed by the Deconstruction and Defense of the Law, 95 YALE L.J. 
969 (1989). 
85 See CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES, supra note 23, at 8. 
86 Williams, supra note 35, at 120 (quoting Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 
HARV. L. REV. 563, 579 (1983). 
87 [d. 
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trines which comprise society.88 Targeted for assault by CLS "are 
legal education, the bar, legal reasoning, rights (including civil 
rights), precedent, doctrine, hierarchy, meritocracy, the prevailing 
liberal political vision, and conventional views of labor and the free 
market."89 
After this deconstruction is complete, the Critical Legal Schol-
ars' aim is to create an egalitarian community whose vital and sus-
taining force is the realization of true community.90 As an alternative 
to our current system of ordered liberal rights, the egalitarian so-
ciety to which CLS aspires would feature decentralized decision-
making; "rules ... set by small groups such as factory workers, 
farm workers, and students[;],,9! continual renegotiation of the 
rules; and equality as the paramount goa1.92 Hierarchy would be 
unnecessary since "everyone would share work, goods, and respon-
sibilities."93 The de-emphasis on individualism resulting from the 
energetic pursuit of community would foster non-competitiveness. 
This in turn would allow the individual human personality to "flour-
ish" in a "non-hierarchical, non-repressive society."94 
III. THE MINORITY SCHOLAR-CRITICAL LEGAL SCHOLAR 
DIALOGUE 
A. Minority Scholar Critiques 
The principal Minority Scholars participating in the dialogue 
are Mari Matsuda, Richard Delgado, Harlon Dalton, Robert Wil-
88 See Delgado, supra note IS, at 302. 
89 Id. at 302 n. 3. See, e.g., Kennedy, Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy, in THE 
POLITICS OF LAW, supra note 58; D. KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF 
HIERARCHY: A POLEMIC AGAINST THE SYSTEM (1983); Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the 
Wagner Act and the Origins of Modem Legal Consciousness, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1978) (attacking 
workplace hierarchies and their judicial legitimization); Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: 
A Casenote on Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 130 U. PENN. L. REV. 1296 (1982); Freeman and 
Mensch, The Public Private Distinction in American Law and Life, 36 BUFFALO L. REV. 237 (1987) 
(public/private distinction); Kelman, supra note 81, at 306-28 (law and economics); Kennedy, 
Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976) (individualism 
and altruism); Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Anti-Discrimination Law: A 
Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978) (equal protection). 
90 See Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative 
Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 11 09 (1981). 
230. 
91 See Delgado, supra note IS, at 313; see also Hutchinson & Monahan, supra note 34, at 
92 See Delgado, supra note IS, at 313. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
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Iiams, Andrew Haines, and Kimberle Crenshaw,95 all of whom teach 
law at various schools across the country. Similar to the CLS pro-
ponents, these scholars do not embody exclusively all minority schol-
ars critiquing CLS. Rather they stand out as representative spokes-
persons, some of whom vividly illustrate their critiques of the 
Movement with intensely personal experiences concerning race and 
society.96 The Minority Scholars are virtually uniform in their as-
sessment of CLS: they find all three major CLS themes-the inde-
terminacy argument, the rights discourse critique, and the CLS 
egalitarian agenda-problematic. They note first, however, several 
positive aspects to CLS: specifically, the Movement's "descriptive"97 
and "prescriptive power."98 Professor Matsuda writes that "[the] 
central descriptive message [of CLS]-that legal ideals are mani-
pulable and that law serves to legitimate existing mal distributions 
of wealth and power-rings true for anyone who has experienced 
life in non-white America."99 The mechanism of trashing in partic-
ular, one Minority Scholar writes, is irreverent and incisive enough 
to penetrate "the apocryphal legal texts ... and myths," and various 
other reifications (ideology operating in statutory or common law 
form) that restrict choices and dialogue. lOo As Professor Matsuda 
further observes, "[k]nowing when doctrine sticks, when it doesn't, 
and why ... are major intellectual contributions of the CLS move-
ment."101 Thus, both the Minority Scholars and CLS recognize that 
political motives guide the use of legal rules that are premised upon 
normatively incorrect doctrine to justify predetermined outcomes. 
The Minority Scholars find equally noteworthy the "prescrip-
tive power" of CLS.102 The quest for an egalitarian society without 
oppression, hierarchy, and maldistribution of wealth in a broad 
sense presents an inspiring and attractive endeavor.103 This egali-
95 Assistant Professor of Law, University of Hawaii; Professor of Law, University of 
Wisconsin; Associate Professor of Law, Yale University; Professor of Law, University of 
Arizona; Professor of Law, William Mitchell University; Assistant Professor of Law, University 
of California at Los Angeles, respectively. 
96 See, e.g., Dalton, The Clouded Prism 72 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 435, 440-47 (1987); 
see also Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARv. c.R.-
C.L. L. REv. 401 (1987). 
97 See Matsuda, supra note 16, at 327-29. 
98 Id. at 329-40. 
99 Id. at 327. 
100 See Williams, supra note 35, at 127. 
101 See Matsuda, supra note 16, at 329. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
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tarian ideal is quintessentially the vision of the future held by many 
people of color and people of limited means. 
The origination of these descriptive and prescriptive contri-
butions within the prestigious and exclusionary walls of mainstream 
legal academia, where most CLS scholars reside, lends legitimacy to 
ultra-leftist jurisprudence in general. Although reluctant to agree 
substantively with CLS, the legal community must at least acknowl-
edge the cogent critical theories put forth by their academic peers. 
Arguably, this legitimacy would not exist if the CLS Movement 
originated from elsewhere in the legal community, such as from 
practicing minority lawyers. In reference to the general legitimation 
of critical scholarship, the Minority Scholars acknowledge that CLS 
has indeed even stimulated minority scholarship: "[s]ignificantly, 
this [commitment to ultra-leftist jurisprudence] ... underscores the 
liberating impact that the CLS analysis has had on the victims of 
racism, propelling them to explore its barriers."lo4 
For the Minority Scholars, however, the realization that the 
composition of CLS is predominately white and male tempers the 
value of these descriptive and prescriptive contributions. 105 The 
absence of a significant minority voice integrated in the Movement's 
theory signals the unattractiveness of the CLS agenda. Vividly cap-
turing this bittersweet realization, and introducing a major criticism 
of CLS, one Minority Scholar writes, 
"[IJike a pack of super-termites, these scholars eat away at the 
trees of legal doctrine and liberal ideals, leaving sawdust in their 
paths. That they do it so well, and so single-mindedly, is com-
pelling; it suggests that this is what the smartest are doing. Never 
mind that no one knows what to do with all the sawdust."i06 
Despite CLS's presentation of insightful and critical social commen-
tary and jurisprudence, substantively its three major themes remain 
troubling to Minority Scholars. 
First, regarding the indeterminacy of law argument, the Su-
preme Court's recent rulings do illustrate the validity of the CLS 
idea that legal rules are manipulable and legal outcomes are subject 
to the ideology and motivations of the politically powerful. 107 But 
CLS fails to address the possibility that racism is the motivation 
104 [d. 
105 See generally id. (arguing that adopting the normative intuitions of persons who have 
actually suffered discrimination might help align CLS theory with the interests of minorities). 
106 [d. at 330. 
107 See Brodin supra note 5; supra notes 4 and 6 and accompanying text. 
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underlying legal decisions which perpetuate oppressive social and 
institutional conditions. lOB Through recognition of the non-objec-
tive, non-formalistic forces influencing legal outcomes (which CLS 
generally terms "ideology"), CLS incidentally raises the possibility-
a very real and intellectually compelling possibility for people of 
color-that racism is one of the non-objective, non-formalistic 
forces. As the Minority Scholars assert, the failure of CLS scholar-
ship to pinpoint and to integrate discussion of the problem of racism 
as a principle reason for inconsistent and discriminatory decisions 
ignores the issue over which most of the exploratory energies of 
minorities are spent. 109 
In its very few works discussing the issue of racism, CLS, be-
cause of its Marxist roots, attributes the occurrence of discrimina-
tory and status quo-perpetuating legal outcomes primarily to class-
based and economic-based discrimination. 110 Racism receives merely 
tangential treatment as an incidental product of class and economic 
strife. In contrast to the CLS view, the Minority Scholars assert that 
class-based and economic-based discrimination as suffered by many 
minorities results from race-based discrimination, not vice versa. III 
The phenomenon of racism manifests itself in a variety of contexts, 
including public housing, employment, and education and in many 
ways fuels the process whereby some unfortunate citizens change 
in the eyes of society from people of color to people of limited 
means. 1J2 
The Minority Scholars posit cogent theoretical support for their 
belief that regardless of changes made to the institutional structure 
of our society, racism will persist as a social-psychological phenom-
enon.113 It occurs in both overt and covert forms and in both mi-
cro-and macro-legal contexts. 114 Accordingly, for these scholars, 
any analysis of the role of law in society necessarily must consider 
the law not only as a means for protecting against racism, but also 
as a means for perpetuating racism. CLS runs afoul of minority 
interests by giving merely tangential treatment to a problem that 
108 See, e.g., Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1335, 1357-8l. 
109 Id.; see, e.g., Freeman, supra note 89; Klare, The Quest for Industrial Democracy and the 
Struggle Against Racism: Perspectives From Labor and Civil Rights Law, 61 OR. L. REV. 157 (1982); 
see also Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1356; Haines, supra note 20, at 706-27 (analyzing Freeman's 
and Klare's writings). 
110 See Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1335, 1357-8l. 
111 Id. 
112 See Haines, supra note 20, at 715. 
113 See Delgado, supra note 15, at 315-2l. 
114 Id. 
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historically has threatened the stability of an entire population of 
African-Americans. 
Second, the Minority Scholars find the CLS critique of liberal 
rights discourse problematic. ll5 In short, CLS asserts that rights and 
rights discourse legitimate unfair distributions of wealth and power 
by focusing on the individual rather than the community, providing 
piecemeal reform, and limiting the overall possibility of reform by 
circumscribing the boundaries of dialogue. 116 False consciousness, 
the belief in the legitimacy of the existing system of liberal rights 
discourse, deludes minorities into accepting and reconciling their 
deprived status. ll7 
The Minority Scholars acknowledge the plausibility of this the-
ory, but assert that false consciousness is not the primary mechanism 
with which the majority culture stymies and diffuses minority re-
formist activity.IIB The Minority Scholars find troubling the idea 
that "[through] absorption of self-defeating ideologies (rights dis-
course) ... " minorities participate in their own oppression. 119 They 
argue that it "smacks" of the very paternalism that CLS purports 
to disdain by suggesting that minorities are unable to comprehend 
fully their own plight and discern who (the majority culture) and 
what (frequently racism) propagates that plight. 120 Other forces, 
they argue, combine to paralyze minority reformist efforts and to 
inject a sense of hopelessness into an already daunting endeavor-
forces such as political and economic "coercion by the dominant 
group; exclusion from clubs, networks, information, and needed 
help at crucial times; [and] microaggressions .... "121 CLS focuses 
inappropriately on minority rather than majority culture. 
The Minority Scholars also take issue with the rights discourse 
critique corollary which holds that faithfully staying within the sys-
tem and engaging in rights discourse results in inadequate piece-
meal reform (the patchwork quilt metaphor).122 CLS argues that 
"[t]hose who control the system weaken [infrasystem] resistance by 
pointing to the occasional concession to, or periodic court victory 
115 See, e.g., id. at 303-12; Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1357, 1366-69; Williams, supra 
note 35, at 125. 
116 See Delgado, supra note 15, at 303. For a discussion of the rights critique, see infra 
notes 62-79 and accompanying text. 
117 See Delgado, supra note 15, at 309-12. 
118 [d. 
119 [d. at 311. 
120 [d. at 308. 
121 [d. at 311. 
122 [d. at 307-08. 
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of, a Black plaintiff or worker as evidence that the system is fair 
and just."123 This corollary contradicts the reality that incremental, 
within-the-system reforms have proven to be the most successful 
reforms. 
Even the American Civil War, the passage of the Thirteenth, 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments of the United States 
Constitution, the passage of the Civil Rights Acts of the 19th 
Century, ... the civil rights demonstrations, the urban revolu-
tions of the 1960's, the passage of the Civil Rights Acts of the 
20th Century ... demonstrate that [minorities] benefit from 
glacial not seismic changes in the operation of American law. 124 
According to CLS, achieving reform in the area of civil rights re-
quires endlessly litigating narrow technical issues at great cost to 
the plaintiff-endeavoring against the considerable inertia of the 
status quo. For Minority Scholars, however, the reality of these 
victories awarding substantive rights squarely refutes the CLS ar-
guments that conventional liberal rights concepts and discourse are 
disutile for minorities. 125 
Finally, the Minority Scholars attribute the problematic aspects 
of CLS theory to the perceived elitist,121> negative,127 and informaP28 
character of the Movement. With respect to elitism and informality, 
the Minority Scholars argue that the trashing of rights discourse is 
plausible for CLS scholars because they reside in privileged posi-
tions in our society. These are positions from which theoretically 
disposing of rights and creating an informal community premised 
upon good will and sharing carries no threat of harm. 129 Implicit 
in this criticism is the suspicion that CLS simply does not take itself 
or its proposed agenda seriously. What is missing, Minority Scholars 
argue, is a measure of reality. 130 
Turning to the issue of negativism, the Minority Scholars find 
that cynicism pervades the CLS Movement's writings and its 
agenda. 131 The process of deconstructing virtually all of society's 
123 Id. at 307. 
124 Haines, supra note 20, at 722. 
125 See Williams, supra note 35, at 123-27; see also Williams, supra note 96, at 414-33. 
126 See, e.g., Matsuda, supra note 16, at 342-45. 
127 See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 15, at 302-12; Williams, supra note 35, at 123-27. 
128 See Delgado, supra note 15, at 314-20. 
129 See Delgado, Critical Legal Studies and the Realities of Race-Does the Fundamental 
Contradiction Have a Corollary? 23 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407 (1988) (asserting that whites 
lack the necessary degree of empathy). 
130 Id. 
I31 See Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1366-69. 
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accepted institutional and jurisprudential norms involves consider-
able negative energy and razes the foundations of a capitalistic and 
democratic society. Minority Scholars believe this process inhibits 
the CLS Movement's ability to generate positive enthusiasm for legal 
and social change. 132 
B. Critical Legal Scholars' Responses to the Minority Scholar Critiques 
The CLS responses come principally from Alan Freeman 133 
and Morton Horowitz. 134 Significantly, only two of over one 
hundred Critical Legal Scholars responded, despite considerable 
energies expended by the Minority Scholars in engaging the Critical 
Legal Scholars in dialogue. This small number of respondents begs 
the question: "How seriously does CLS, as a movement, take the 
concerns of minorities?" Perhaps many of the Critical Legal Scholars 
considered the two responses adequately representative of the CLS 
position. More likely, given that CLS members typically do not 
retreat from an opportunity to express their views on a controversial 
subject, most Critical Legal Scholars were simply not sufficiently 
aroused by the subject of minority concerns to respond meaning-
fully. Moreover, the responses fail to engage the Minority Scholars' 
critiques of CLS directly. Rather than give the critiques systematic 
and comprehensive treatment (the manner in which they were pre-
sented), the CLS responses evaded much of the substance presented 
by the Minority Scholars, amounting to a general defense of CLS 
theory. The Critical Legal Scholars defend the indeterminacy ar-
gument and the trashing of liberal rights theory, while only subtex-
tually incorporating the problem of racism in these defenses. The 
CLS scholars also argue that they are experientially qualified to 
critique rights and rights discourse. Professor Freeman in particular 
argues that their extensive involvement in the civil rights movement 
in the 1960s establishes an intimate familiarity with the territory 
and texture of liberal rights discourse. He further argues that this 
intimate familiarity creates a genuinely serious, and not just intel-
lectually curious, interest in the minority agenda. 13s 
The CLS responses undertake a pragmatic defense of the 
Movement's rights discourse critique. This defense holds that prem-
ising liberal rights theory on the belief in the existence of funda-
132 See Haines, supra note 20, at 732. 
133 See generally Freeman, supra note 56. 
134 See generally Horowitz, Rights, 23 HARv. c.R.-c.L. L. REV. 393 (1988). 
135 See generally Freeman, supra note 56, at 299-315. 
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mental, natural, formalistic rights ignores the reality that liberal 
rights discourse developed first as a politically recognized social 
construction and then became legitimate law through positive en-
actment. 136 The long line of well-recognized social, political, and 
scientific movements contributing to the current version of liberal 
rights discourse illustrates this developmental reality. From the 
philosophical writings of Descartes, through Marxism, the issues of 
the existence and utility of rights have commanded considerable 
intellectual energy.137 
Critical Legal Scholars acknowledge the value of victories in 
litigation brought by rights discourse to minorities and other socie-
tally marginalized groups of people. 138 The popular perception of 
liberal rights discourse incorrectly envisions it as a form of protec-
tion for numerically large groups of people, such as social or class 
groupings (based upon class or race). But the historical roots of the 
development of liberal rights discourse in this country, CLS argues, 
indicates otherwise. These historical roots indicate that liberal rights 
discourse originated as a form of protection for individual private 
property.139 The original framers of the liberal rights legal system 
established the system as protection from the pitfalls of popular 
revolt. 140 To date, the law affords the benefits of collective rights 
only to corporations based upon their special position in relation to 
the state in a capitalistic economy.141 Arguably, minorities might 
obtain more direct benefit from the implementation of a form of 
group rights or entitlements. 
As illustrated by CLS's deconstruction of the normative touch-
stones for contract law, legal rules derived from principles of capi-
talism and liberalism provide little stability and predictive value to 
individual citizens. 142 For example, the judiciary'S freedom to choose 
between private individual rights and the state's public interest cre-
ates instability and indeterminacy. Also, in family law, courts decide 
between a parent's private right to family autonomy and the state's 
interest in the protection of abused or neglected children. 143 In 
136 See Horowitz, supm note 134, at 403-04. 
137 See Freeman, supm note 56, at 318-19. 
m See genemlly Horowitz, supm note 134. 
139 [d. at 395-400; see also Freeman, supm note 56, at 355-62. 
140 See genemlly Tushnet, The Constitution as an Economic Document: Beard Revisited, 56 
CEO. WASH. L. REV. 106 (1987). 
141 See Horowitz, supm note 134 at 400-01. 
142 See Note, supm note 40, and accompanying text. 
143 See Horowitz, supra note 134, at 403. 
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labor law, courts decide between "the private rights of association 
of labor unions" and the state interest in restraining the union's 
unreasonable exercise of power over its members.144 CLS "con-
demns" judicial balancing tests because they reinforce the existence 
of conflicting values and require a judge to choose between them 
without a normative theory of social justice. 145 
Additionally, CLS argues that rooting rights discourse in an 
ideal more egalitarian and communitarian than the competitively 
individualist liberal ideal better serves the interests of minorities 
and marginalized groups.146 The courts' role as unanchored arbiter 
of those interests necessarily would be minimized. Thus, a measure 
of stability and determinacy would be restored to decisions involving 
groups less powerful than the groups controlling the machinery of 
the legal system. 
Subtextually, the Critical Legal Scholars respond to the CLS 
Movement's failure to address racism by providing exhaustive his-
torical references and sociological statistics documenting the per-
vasive existence of racism in society.147 The role of racism in the 
perpetuation of maldistributions of wealth and power is also ex-
plored. True to form, the CLS scholars embark on this exploration 
using deconstruction. In particular, CLS trashes the theory of equal-
ity of opportunity which, mainstream jurisprudence alleges, sup-
ports our economic system and democratic form of government. 148 
CLS exposes this notion as essentially an illusion. Popular percep-
tions hold that equal access is available to public offices and em-
ployment positions-performance meritoriously determines which 
positions are attained, but each citizen has the opportunity to com-
pete. But in reality racial dichotomies in wealth and power deter-
mine access to positions in public office and private business. Instead 
of ability, talent, and performance determining access, economic 
status typically bears the greatest determinative value. 149 Moreover, 
the current economic status of many minorities stems in part from 
historical, economic and political discrimination fueled by racism. 
Thus, CLS argues, deconstruction of the ideological assumptions 
144 Id. 
145 See Tushnet, Antiformalism in Recent Constitutional Theory, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1502, 
1516-18 (1985); cf. Lewis, The Unbalanced Crits and their Overbalanced Critics, 40 MERCER L. 
REV. 913, 916-20 (1989) (arguing that judicial balancing tests are both legitimate and useful). 
146 See Horowitz, supra note 134, at 405-06. 
147 See Freeman, supra note 56, at 355-62. 
148 Id. at 354-85. 
149 Id. at 382-83. 
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underpinning the notion of equality of opportunity reveals inherent 
indeterminacy. 
The CLS scholars perform further deconstruction on the no-
tion of equality of opportunity by revealing the contradictions un-
derlying the concepts of ability and talent. They argue that "there 
is no such thing as a natural and objective 'talent' .... [S]uch skills 
are socially and historically contingent, the ones a particular culture 
needs and wants in its time."15o The more distorted the power 
relations within a culture, the more likely that the powerful will 
bear the valued talents. 151 This critique applies to heavy reliance by 
the academic community upon standardized test scores in evaluat-
ing student performance. 152 The premise underlying the argument 
holds that the tests reward culturally and economically biased 
knowledge. 153 This bias segregates the testing population into the 
already crystallized cultural and economic hierarchies. 154 The de-
clining emphasis upon standardized test scores by academic insti-
tutions supports the flaws exposed by the CLS deconstruction. 155 
IV. IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES 
The dialogue exploring the schism between minoritIes and 
CLS, while crediting CLS for some important contributions to the 
general sphere of jurisprudence, also highlights important differ-
ences between the social-legal interests of minorities and the social-
legal interests and activities of CLS. These differences appear sub-
stantively irreconcilable. The incisive and critical deconstruction of 
law which exposes the underlying conflicts that breed social injustice 
is the most useful contribution from CLS. But trashing as a process 
of theoretical analysis differs from trashing as a real-world renun-
ciation of the current legal machinery. Significantly, CLS espouses 
both forms of trashing, while the Minority Scholars espouse only 




154 [d. One CLS Scholar writes: "A Black applicant to professional school, whose test 
scores are lower than those of a competing white applicant, asks for admission on grounds 
of 'affirmative action.' Everybody in that interaction (including the applicant) momentarily 
submits to the spell of the worldview promoted in that discourse, that the scores measure an 
'objective' merit (though nobody really has the foggiest idea what they measure besides 
standardized test-taking ability) that would have to be set aside to let him in." TIKKUN, supra 
note 53, at 16. 
155 [d. 
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the former. The latter concept of trashing has little utility to lawyers 
who seek to achieve empowering civil rights gains through litigation. 
Trashing our current rights discourse en route to creating an ideal 
egalitarian community fails to further certain interests of minori-
ties-short term interests in achieving situation ally specific distri-
butive and corrective justice, and long term interests in effectuating 
changes to the current arrangement of legal apparatus so as to 
provide a measure of institutional protection for the future. 
Regarding both short term and long term interests, the only 
litigative strategy posited by CLS entails politicizing the entire liti-
gation process. This strategy suggests that lawyers use inflammatory 
techniques to counteract the false consciousness-inducing effect of 
the current liberal ideology which is exerted upon the masses. 1S6 
These techniques involve publicizing trials to capture the attention 
of the general public, then using the public forum thus created to 
deconstruct the legal system and lay bare the inherent irrationality 
of the system before all of society.157 CLS argues that "[the] first 
principle of a 'counter-hegemonic' legal practice must be to subor-
dinate the goal of getting people their rights to the goal of building 
an authentic or unalienated political consciousness."158 
This strategy is prohibitively unattractive for many marginal-
ized citizens seeking vindication of their rights through adjudica-
tion. 159 Sacrificing the vindication of one's rights to effectuate this 
strategy is antithetical to the motivation for entering into litiga-
tion.160 It ignores the economic hardships that force one to resort 
to litigation in the first place. Also, the strategy wrongly assumes 
that elevating the collective goal of deconstructing the legal system 
benefits the plaintiff more than persuasively arguing the law to 
attain an individual goal in one's own trial. How many individual 
plaintiffs must sacrifice the opportunity to vindicate their rights in 
order to incite a mass political consciousness that prompts the over-
turn of the current system? 
1,6 See Gabel & Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical Legal Theory and the 
Practice of Law, in CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES, supra note 23, at 303. 
157 Id. at 306-21. As seen by CLS, examples of successful utilization of this approach 
are the Chicago Eight Trial and the Inez Garcia Trial, both of which took place in the I960s 
and early 1970s during the heyday of the radical left. 
158 Id. at 303-04. 
159 See Delgado, supra note 15 at 307-08. 
160 Id. Professor Delgado aptly points out that "[aJ court order directing a housing 
authority to disburse funds for heating in subsidized housing may postpone the revolution, 
or it may not. In the meantime, the order keeps a number of poor families warm. This may 
mean more to them than it does to a comfortable academic working in a warm office." !d. 
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Aside from these impractical suggestions for practicing attor-
neys, the primary irreconcilable difference between CLS and mi-
norities remains the CLS egalitarian ideal. In brief summary, CLS 
espouses trashing liberal rights discourse because it maintains the 
status quo by restricting the development of new approaches to the 
protection of individual and collective interests. 161 The system of 
ordering human affairs that supplants liberalism in the ideal egal-
itarian community would be informal, associational, and non-hier-
archical. Individual and collective interests would be protected by 
the associational interactions of the members of this community. 
Conflicts in this community would be cognizable (as opposed to the 
latent, underlying conflicts in liberalism), the collective awareness 
of one's actions and their consequences would give rise to the obe-
dient recognition of collective responsibilities. 
Several irreconcilable problems plague this egalitarian ideal. 
First, the accepted definitions of racism on which minorities, soci-
ologists, and psychologist agree are ignored. 162 Racism is a social-
psychological phenomenon, one that causes minorities to be skep-
tical of human nature. 163 For the Minority Scholars, racism does not 
have its origins in disparate economic and social conditions; rather, 
disparate economic and social conditions frequently are the result 
of racist beliefs and actions. 164 The recent rise in racially motivated 
incidents on college campuses, traditionally believed to be bastions 
of liberalism, illustrates the prudence of minority skepticism. 165 
Given the psychological origins of racism, and given minorities' 
perception that racism is a primary threat to their economic, polit-
ical, and social stability, the egalitarian ideal put forth by CLS ap-
pears inadequate for serving minority interests. CLS fails to provide 
an alternative to the concept of rights in its egalitarian ideal that 
would protect minorities from the manifestations of racism. This 
omission is alienating for the Minority Scholars who remark that, 
at a minimum, "[r]ights do, at times, give pause to those who would 
otherwise oppress us .... "166 Entrusting the protection of personal 
freedoms to the "good will" of the majority group in CLS's informal 
society is tantamount to surrendering all of what little security is 
161 See supra notes 62-87 and accompanying text. 
162 See Delgado, supra note 15, at 316-18. 
163 Id. 
164 See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text. 
165 See, e.g., Wilkerson, Campus Blacks Feel Racism's Nuances, N.Y. Times, April 17, 1988, 
§ I, at 1, col. 3. 
166 Delgado, supra note 15, at 305. 
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provided by the current legal and political institutions. 167 Even as-
suming, arguendo, that trashing and deconstruction are so popularly 
effective that a sufficient societal consciousness is generated to re-
form the current system, what protection is there in the interim 
between the trashing and the attainment of the ideal? The egalitar-
ian agenda lacks even the slightest realistic plausibility. It remains 
merely an ideal and not a viable alternative system of arranging 
human affairs. 
CLS stops short of instituting a new system of rights, unable to 
elude its own trashing: "Until and unless we have successfully jet-
tisoned [trashed] our dominant belief systems, any attempt to for-
mulate a positive program will likely reintroduce the very patterns 
of domination and alienation that we seek to escape."168 Thus, the 
relentless deconstruction of normative sources creates a Catch-22 
in which an analogue to rights never may be created because it 
would simply be another reified instrument of oppression. 
The Minority Scholars suggest an alternative to the CLS ideal, 
providing the conceptual foundations of a social-legal agenda that 
would adequately serve minority interests. 169 Analysis of this social-
legal agenda indicates that the differences between CLS and mi-
nority aims are indeed irreconcilable. The agenda suggested by the 
Minority Scholars would have as its guiding principle "the express 
need for understanding and coping with racism."17o In contrast, the 
CLS agenda has as its guiding principle the deconstruction of nor-
mative sources rooted in institutional as opposed to associational 
touchstones. These two pursuits are not necessarily incompatible, 
but the Minority Scholars' agenda bears more immediate relevancy 
to the concerns of minorities. That agenda's goal is to eliminate the 
very real threat of racism and its manifestations. 
In the Minority Scholars' ideal, a critical light would necessarily 
be cast on the activity of society, scrutinizing distributions and mal-
distributions of wealth not only for class-based discrimination but 
especially for race-based discrimination. l7l Minority Scholars sug-
gest correcting maldistributions of wealth by appeals to the individ-
ual self-interest in equitable power and resource alignments which 
benefit all citizens. In order to cope with racism, the society would 
167 [d. at 303. 
168 Dalton, supra note 96, at 436 n.4. 
169 Delgado, supra note 15, at 320. 
170 [d. 
17l [d. at 321. 
1991] MINORITIES AND CLS 163 
need a strong central authority capable of diligent enforcement and 
punishment efforts, as a result of an unwavering skepticism of 
human nature. The society necessarily would be formal. 172 
The informal and decentralized society constituting the CLS 
ideal contrasts sharply with this Minority Scholar ideal. The two 
ideals, perhaps at an abstract level, share a vision of a society in 
which citizens live their lives unfettered by oppression. However, 
the Minority Scholar ideal, by proposing institutional protections 
which CLS does not, moves from an abstract ideal to a realistic one. 
Most notably, the Minority Scholar ideal represents an ideal that 
minorities perceive to be attainable within the current system of 
liberal rights. It is an ideal in pursuit of which many minority 
members of the legal community spend their energies. 
The Minority Scholars argue persuasively that the irreconcila-
ble differences in large part stem from the composition of the CLS 
Movement. CLS, they argue, lacks the empathetic perspective-the 
actual experience of victimization-to appreciate minorities' com-
pelling need for a stable and functional system of liberal rights. 
"Those with whom [the average Critical Legal Scholar] comes in 
contact in his daily life-landlords, employers, public authorities-
generally treat him with respect and deference."173 Ironically, a few 
CLS scholars have actually experienced such victimization: 
[W]hen two Crits at an eastern law school were experiencing 
tenure difficulty, allegedly because of their politics and inno-
vative teaching, CLS members around the country wrote to the 
university's president, urging him to investigate charges that the 
law school's personnel procedures were biased and infringed 
the Crits' rights of academic freedom. 174 
Rendered a disadvantaged minority in the context of a more pow-
erful majority academic culture, CLS grasped for a principle, that 
of rights, in order to achieve their vision of corrective justice. Iron-
ically, in doing so, the actions of CLS resemble the actions of racial 
minorities in the larger context of American society. 
The CLS-Minority Scholar dialogue was instigated to explore 
the schism between traditional allies. Although the dialogue high-
lighted the powerfully incisive character of the Movement's critical 
jurisprudence, the Movement's deconstructive (as opposed to re-
constructive) agenda conflicts with the determination of people of 
172 [d. 
173 [d. at 306. 
174 [d. at 306 n. 35. (emphasis added). 
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color to secure protection via reforms within the existing system of 
liberal rights. This conflict accounts for the minority perception that 
the CLS egalitarian ideal inadequately protects their interests by 
failing to counteract the possibility that racism will manifest itself 
politically, socially, and economically, during the transition to a more 
ideal society and in the ideal society. 
v. CONCLUSION 
Unfortunately, the same group of liberal reformist students 
who allied with minorities in the 1960s and achieved substantive 
civil rights reform are no longer so allied. The development and 
maturation of CLS for nearly twelve years without the presence of 
an influential minority perspective produced an ultra-radical juris-
prudence which inadequately serves the social-legal reform needs 
of minorities. Consequently, CLS in its current form remains simply 
an incisive and insightful critical jurisprudential tool, not a plausible 
social-legal reform theory for minorities. 
John Hardwick 
